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As one who has criticized Mr. Nader and his associates for advocating
more and more economic regulation while simultaneously document-
ing its past failures,' I applaud much of what is said in the preceding
pages. The unqualified statements that "present economic regula-
tion lacks both a comprehensive theory and a consistent goal .. ." and
"that our unguided regulatory system undermines competition and
entrenches monopoly at the public's expense. ."2 are obvious conclu-
sions to be drawn from the so-called "Nader Reports."3 It is significant,
however, that Mr. Nader and Mr. Green have categorically drawn
them, for their credibility with some parts of our society may counter-
act the widespread conviction that faith in economic regulation is the
mark of the educated Twentieth Century man.
My misgivings are rather with their proposals for reform, which call
for significant deregulation but also identify a number of areas where
government intervention is said to be appropriate. The difference be-
tween this approved regulation and the kind they condemn seems to
me essentially cosmetic and based largely on their idiosyncratic prefer-
ences, rather than on economic theory. Their reasons for condemning
existing regulation, therefore, leave Mr. Nader and Mr. Green in the
grasp of creeping capitalism, for their argument, if any deference is to
be paid to logic, calls inexorably for a clear-cut affirmation of the free
market.
Economic regulation has proven to be a noble but futile endeavor.
The catalog of fiascos collected by Mr. Nader and Mr. Green demon-
strates that proposition, and it is by no means exhaustive. Their dis-
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cussion of the I.C.C., for example, arrays only a fraction of the mis-
chief it has contrived.4
Mr. Nader and Mr. Green correctly identify one source of regulatory
failure as the misuse of economic theory.r All too often the underlying
justification for government regulation has been theoretically defective
or distortions of theory have been used to justify regulatory fiat aiding
special interests. They might well have added two other common errors
made by advocates of regulation, common enough that Mr. Nader
and Mr. Green occasionally commit them themselves. The first is
assuming that any departure from the economist's model of perfect
competition justifies regulation. Of course it does not. The model is
but an abstraction designed solely as an analytic or pedagogic tool.
Because no claim is made that it accurately describes reality or that
only perfect competition maximizes consumer welfare, a departure
from the model is not itself proof of a net injury to consumers. For
example, no one contends that consumers have perfect knowledge in
the real world, even though it is frequently assumed in the model
for analytic purposes. This divergence between reality and academic
assumptions, however, is not itself sufficient to make a case for regu-
lation. Because the collection and transmittal of knowledge consumes
society's resources, it is not costless, and may itself be a commodity best
allocated by the market. Similarly, the model of perfect competition
does not describe the only circumstances in which consumer welfare is
maximized. Industrial concentration may in fact be better for consum-
ers than atomistic competition when there are economies of scale.
Something more than a departure from the abstraction of perfect
competition must thus be shown to justify government intervention.
The kind of market failure which may call for regulation involves a
failure of competition (natural monopoly), free rider effects (national
defense), externalities (auto pollution), or the like--cases in which vol-
untary exchange is thought to be inhibited rather than facilitated by
free markets.
The second error is failing to distinguish between regulation of this
sort, which expedites free exchange (market supporting), and that
which inhibits it for ethical reasons or personal preference (market
supplanting). Mr. Nader and Mr. Green sometimes seem to advocate
the former, sometimes the latter, without pausing to distinguish be-
tween them. Indeed, for all the economic gloss of their article, most
4. See generally R. FEL.E"rH, supra note 3.
5. Green & Nader, supra note 2, at 872-75.
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of their suggestions for regulation appear to be based on their own
value preferences rather than established market failure-preferences
which they spend little time explaining, much less justifying.
II
Mr. Nader and Mr. Green identify a second source of regulatory
failure in the processes used to regulate. Just as economic regulation
suffers from the lack of basis in economic theory, it also has no basis
in theories about which legal institutions are best suited to particular
regulatory goals.
Three principal mechanisms are employed to carry out economic
regulation. The first is the direct statutory command. At times it is
quite specific, e.g., the Fair Labor Standards Act;0 at others, it is more
general, e.g., the Sherman Act.7 In either case, judicial enforcement
is required, although considerable power to initiate proceedings may
be lodged in the Executive Branch. The second mechanism is the
delegation of authority to some part of the Executive Branch to execute
a statutory mandate of more or less specificity, e.g., housing and HUD. 8
The final device is the independent regulatory agency to which a con-
siderable amount of discretion is delegated. 9 The distribution of re-
sponsibility among these mechanisms often seems random and each has
encountered formidable problems in carrying out its assigned tasks.
No matter which method is employed, failure will result when the
theoretical justification for regulation is inadequate. At best, the out-
come will be random and arbitrary; at worst, many will suffer sig-
nificant economic harm. But even where a theoretical basis for regu-
lation exists, intervention can be justified only if regulatory processes
are likely to make matters better rather than worse. Any such conclu-
sion must overcome formidable hurdles. Where, for example, the regu-
latory mission calls on the agency to reproduce the results of a well
functioning market, the endeavor may be hopeless. There is rarely
any way to determine outside of an actual market what those results
are. Market results-whether the optimal number of firms in an in-
dustry, the optimal size of a firm, or the market clearing price-are
reached in the context of changing variables, with trial and error and
the imitation of successful competitors as the principal tactics of par-
6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. (1970).
7. 19 U.S.C. § 102 (1970).
8. See Housing and Urban Development Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401 et seq. (1970).
9. See, e.g., Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 14 (1970).
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ticipating firms. Economic success or failure, not hypothetical specu-
lations, signal the result. Business decisions thus must often be made
quickly, pragmatically, and by fiat. Law, however, imposes constraining
mechanisms: Procedural safeguards, the need to collect and present
evidence, the demands of an adversary process-all create an infinitely
more cumbersome process.
Economic results, moreover, depend on intangibles which can be
measured only by market performance. The size of a firm, for example,
depends on many intangibles-morale, leadership, administrative abil-
ity, organization-which can be measured by the market alone. A firm
with an exceptionally talented management will be more efficient than
its competitors and will grow. Consumers will lose if it is broken up
and its superior efficiency destroyed because of governmental specula-
tion that a smaller firm is optimal. Agency adjudication simply cannot
measure the intangibles which lead to economic success and distin-
guish the efficient from the harmful. One might as well choose the
National League batting champion without considering the scorecards.
Regulation by executive or independent agency encounters addi-
tional difficulties. Due process constraints and a desire to protect the
lower bureaucracy from partisan decisions necessarily decrease worker
discipline in the civil service. Survival for the bureaucrat often de-
pends on matters other than the expeditious performance of his duties.
This is one of the lessons of the Nader Report on the F.T.C.10 Yet,
at higher levels, partisan influence is substantial." And partisanship,
all would agree, is inconsistent with intelligent economic regulation.
Moreover, government by its very nature reacts to political pressure,
rather than impartial standards, and one should anticipate that execu-
tive or independent agencies will respond most favorably to those with
the greatest ability and incentive to organize and press their claims.
Typically, a small number of individuals or firms (low cost of organi-
zation) with significant and enduring interests (high potential bene-
fits) are better able to organize than larger groups with more transitory
matters at stake. Thus, those the agency is supposed to regulate may be
most successful in influencing its behavior and many have concluded,
along with Mr. Nader and Mr. Green, that numerous agencies serve,
not as protective mechanisms shielding consumers from industry power,
but rather as vehicles protecting industry itself from competition.
Again, the Nader Reports document this conclusion." '
10. See, e.g., Cox et al., supra note 3, at 148.
11. E.g., FELLmETH, supra note 3, at 1-4.
12. See note 3 supra.
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A final drawback of regulation is that government embodies many
of the very imperfections attributed to the market by those who call
for regulation. In a very literal sense, therefore, regulation can be a
cure worse than the disease. Much has been made of the consumer's
inability to affect his market destinies and his lack of product infor-
mation. Yet surely these criticisms are even more cogent where govern-
ment is involved. A product which does not satisfy consumers is far
more likely to disappear than a government ruling. When the I.C.C.
prohibits new truckers from entering the market, consumers rarely
know of the ruling-much less why it was made-and, of course, can
do nothing to change it. If the Edsel had had I.C.C. protection, there
probably would have been far fewer red faces at the Ford Motor
Company.
III
Mr. Nader and Mr. Green are thus to be applauded for concluding
that substantial deregulation is essential. Their other proposals for
reform, however, entail regulation which is in principle indistinguish-
able from that which they condemn.
Once we make the assumption that the free market is to serve as the
principal coordinator of economic activity, a theory of regulation must
be two-pronged: First, it must establish those cases of market failure
sufficiently serious to justify intervention, along with the goals such
regulation should strive to achieve; second, it should describe the legal
processes appropriate to the various kinds of regulation.
Since an important reason for choosing the market is to serve indi-
vidual consuming tastes, a theory of regulation ought, where possible,
transcend the preferences of particular individuals.' 3 A preference for
the welfare of certain groups or for conduct which appeals to one's
personal tastes is simply not a general theory of economic regulation:
Individual value preferences can justify all forms of governmental in-
tervention once the legitimate requirements of the political process
have been satisfied.
Viewed in these terms, Mr. Nader and Mr. Green's theory of regu-
lation is utterly inadequate. Apart from occasional ad hoc statements
indicating their own preferences, their exposition is, on the on hand,
13. Departures from the market can, of course, be justified on the grounds that a
generalized moral or ethical norm calls for other results, e.g., toy safety. Such depar-
tures should be clearly labeled as such and accompanied by a thorough discussion of
the origin of the governing norm and its scope, as well as of the costs of abandoning
the market in the particular instance. Mr. Nader and Mr. Green make no such claims,
much less engage in such a discussion, on behalf of the regulation they suggest.
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too broad to give guidance as to what circumstances call for regulation
or which mechanisms lessen its inherent risks and, on the other, too
narrow to justify many of the demands for government action made by
Mr. Nader and his associates.
A. Safety Regulation
Consider, for example, safety regulation. Mr. Nader has been criti-
cized for imposing on consumers his preferences as to the proper trade-
off between risks and the costs of avoiding them.14 The justification
for safety regulation Mr. Nader and Mr. Green now offer seeks to
avoid such criticism by arguing that "it is better to prevent consumer
harm than to compensate it later."' To the extent that compensation
through tort litigation is inadequate-whether because of legal sloth
or an inability to calculate damages-the real cost of a risk will not
be properly allocated. Nevertheless, if regulation is to be justified, it
must be shown, first, that compensation is in fact inadequate in the
case of the particular product, and second, that the benefits lost by
regulation are less than the difference between the compensation re-
ceived by injured parties and that which adequately covers the loss.
If we apply this formula to one of Mr. Nader and Mr. Green's ex-
amples, drug regulation, the difficulty of making such a showing is
evident. Let us assume that the damages paid in tort by drug manu-
facturers are less than the cost of the injuries caused. Mr. Nader and
Mr. Green would require drug regulation in such circumstances. Yet
recent findings have demonstrated that rigorous drug regulation sig-
nificantly impedes the rate of introduction of new drugs and thus pre-
vents beneficial as well as harmful drugs from entering the market.1
And those who suffer from the absence of beneficial drugs get no com-
pensation at all. That the cost-effectiveness argument supports the call
for regulation thus seems on the available facts anything but self-
evident.
The second justification offered for safety regulation-that "the harm
inflicted may simply be unacceptable to its victims" T-is, save where
externalities are present, simply no theory at all. Mr. Nader and Mr.
Green would make autos crashworthy, but how does one explain comn-
pulsory seat belts in terms of consumer judgments as to unacceptable
14. See note 1 supra.
15. Green & Nader, supra note 2, at 885.
16. S. PEL. mrAN, THE B..EFrrS AND COSTS OF NEW DRtG REGULATION (1972).
17.' Green & Nader, supra note 2, at 885.
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risks? After all, consumers who find the risk "unacceptable" can have
seat belts installed and hardly need a loud, continuous buzzer to tor-
ment them into buckling up. Clearly, the judgment of acceptability
stems from the preferences of Mr. Nader and Mr. Green, rather than
from those of auto buyers.
In light of the campaigns mounted in the name of consumerism,
the rhetoric of cost effectiveness and unacceptability is thus just so
much boilerplate justifying the imposition of the campaigners' prefer-
ences. Neither rationale supports, for example, the campaign over the
sturdiness of automobile bumpers. Similarly, while the Nader Report
on the F.D.A. criticizes white bread because it is less nutritious than
other breads, it concedes that less nutritious breads may be more
profitable.' 8 The only explanation for that phenomenon, of course,
is consumer choice.
Mr. Nader and Mr. Green make much of the fact that existing eco-
nomic regulation has been turned to the advantage of special interest
groups. There is nothing inherent in safety regulation, however, that
makes it immune from such manipulation. Product safety regulation
is, in fact, well suited for use as a weapon against one's competitors.
Indeed, it is merely one form of restriction on entry. Had Mr. Nader
been the force in the 50's that he is today, it is likely that he would
have made strange bedfellows with the American auto industry in its
battle against the small (and less safe) foreign car.19
Because Mr. Nader and Mr. Green fail to justify safety regulation
on grounds of true market failure, their discussion does not elaborate
a theory of regulation, but is rather a statement of their personal aver-
sion for certain risks (or for others taking those risks). A theory sup-
porting some forms of safety regulation may, however, exist. Where
safety information is not accessible to competitors or testing organiza-
tions, the case for regulation in the form of inspection-sanitary condi-
tions in food processing, for example-is stronger. Similarly, where
products do not have close substitutes-cigarettes perhaps-and there
seems to be a high risk of physical damage or addiction, a case of
market failure can arguably be made. One might contend that the
lack of close substitutes constitutes a failure of competition limiting
market incentives to expose a product's dangers and that the generation
of information from other sources, e.g., independent testing agencies,
will be slower than governmental processes. Mr. Nader and Mr.
18. J. TuNF.R, THE CHEMICAL FEAST 111-12 (Grossman, 1970).
19. Cf. L. DODGE, SMALL ON SAFETY: THE DESIGNED-IN DANGERS OF TIlE VOLKSWAGEN
(1972).
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Green forego any such discussion, I must assume, because market fail-
ure simply does not justify the kind of regulation they would enact.
B. Externalities
Citing auto pollution as an example, Mr. Nader and Mr. Green
also call for the regulation of externalities where persons not a party
to an economic transaction are injured by it.20 No one would deny,
of course, that externalities are an example of market failure, but Mr.
Nader and Mr. Green overstate the extent to which they serve as a
guide for regulation. The externality formula does tell us which parties
will benefit from regulation but precious little about whether, when,
or how we ought to go about it.
In fact, almost any economic regulation may be justified by external-
ity theory. Those who say they suffer psychic harm from the mere
thought of others watching obscene movies can make a case for regu-
lating the sale of pornography, just as Mr. Nader and Mr. Green pre-
sumably can make a case for seat belts on the grounds that they can-
not bear the thought of people risking life and limb. Calling something
an externality, therefore, merely throws us back on our personal value
systems.
Just as the significance of an externality depends on the eye (or nose
or mind) of the beholder, so too their elimination may have very dif-
ferent distributional effects on individuals and groups. Consider auto
pollution: Regulating pollution by requiring anti-pollution devices on
all cars will benefit those who live in certain urban areas and those
particularly susceptible to air pollution more than it benefits those
who live in rural areas or those with hardy respiratory systems. Such
regulation will injure car owners generally, who must pay more for
their car, burn more gas, and, because of the increased demand, pay
more for the gas they burn. The price of oil may also be affected by the
increase in gas demand, a result which must certainly aggravate the
fuel crisis.2 1 Much of the cost of reducing auto pollution will thus be
20. Green & Nader, supra note 2, at 886.
21. The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1970), requires emission control measures for
the 1973 model year which increase gasoline consumption at least seven percent. Sub-
stantially stricter requirements for 1976 promise even less efficient performance. Newsweek,
Jan. 22, 1973, at 54.
Demand for petroleum products, including demand by motorists, is expected to grow
by fifty-eight percent between 1972 and 1985. Id. Capacity and resources to supply that
demand are in doubt. Id. at 52, 53.
Current Environmental Protection Agency plans to meet ambient air quality standards
in the Los Angeles smog basin by 1975 include conversion of comineraal fleet vehicles
to natural gas operation, N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1973, at 41, col. 2, but this action would
shift demand to other fossil fuels in equally short supply. Newsweek, Jan. 22, 1973, at 53.
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borne by those who neither significantly cause pollution nor greatly
benefit from its regulation, e.g., the rural poor who need a car. Impos-
ing such costs on them seems rather like the original externality the
regulation was designed to remedy. Mr. Nader and Mr. Green's call for
such regulation necessarily implies a personal judgment that the gain to
some groups outweighs the harm to others. Nor do they suggest why
government regulators will be able to make such judgments more fairly
and efficiently than previous regulators dealing with similar economic
or technical complexities.22
I am not arguing that we should not regulate activities entailing sig.
nificant externalities. They are a type of market failure and thus carry
no presumption with them. Nevertheless, regulation entails difficult
cost-benefit judgments as well as normative or distributional decisions
favoring-some groups over others-issues which are often obscured and
never resolved by saying that regulation is needed "to protect the pub.
lic."
C. Enabling Regulation
Mr. Nader and Mr. Green also approve of something called enabling
regulation as a theoretically valid form of market control.23 Their de-
scription is, however, so broad and so vague as to drain the phrase of
meaning.
Of course, the antitrust laws can be employed as a market support-
ing rather than a market supplanting device. But Mr. Nader and Mr.
Green have a view of antitrust which does not seem theoretically valid.
For example, they speak of concentration as though it necessarily and
invariably entails a net loss to consumers. There is no a priori reason
to draw that conclusion. In the case of the hypothetical absolute mo-
nopolist, economic theory does, of course, tell us that there will be an
efficiency loss in that resources will be misallocated because price will
be above marginal cost and output will be restricted. But until one
knows what efficiency gains-reduction of marginal cost-are produced
22. The Los Angeles situation illustrates the incredible complexity of measuring costs
and benefits. In addition to conversion of some vehicles from petroleum to natural gas
operation, note 21 supra, the Environmental Protection Agency is considering, gasoline
rationing and restrictions on vehicle use designed to reduce auto travel by as much as
eighty percent. N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1973, at 10, col. 6. Since the Los Angeles area has
virtually no effective public transportation, the proposed strictures would have a severe
impact on the economy of the area generally and certain groups within it in particular.
California officials doubt that auto traffic can be reduced by even twenty percent. Id. at
21, col. 1. And the rationing that would be involved will entail allocational difficulties
so severe many doubt it could ever be implemented.
23. Green & Nader, supra note 2, at 886.
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through economies of scale, the factual conclusion that consumers suffer
from concentration cannot be made.2 4
Concentration is not restricted to basic industries but is found in
many markets. The fact is that many small businesses are concentrated
in terms of their market and are in principle indistinguishable from
more visible industries such as the auto industry. Within convenient
distance from the Yale Law School, for example, there has, in my
memory, been only one drug store. Relative to the price of its average
product, its local market power is probably significant, as is the cumu-
lative national impact of countless similar examples. A consistent, prin-
cipled assault on concentration would thus involve a frontal attack
on vast areas of the economy and not just on certain highly visible,
and politically vulnerable, industries.
Antitrust is, moreover, a regulation aimed at a short-run problem.
So long as government does not restrict entry, any concentration not
based on efficiency will ultimately be destroyed by market forces.
Market forces may be considerably slower than the judicial processes,
however, and antitrust may be necessary to prevent the short-run estab-
lishment of market power through overt collusion or merger. The
antitrust enforcer should aim, therefore, not at concentration brought
about by internal growth, but rather at overt collusion or mergers in-
volving significant market power. To go as far as Mr. Nader and Mr.
Green seem to suggest would in effect require the courts to determine
the optimal size or number of firms in an industry, the same impossible
task of impersonating a well-functioning market they shun in the con-
text of rate regulation.
If enabling regulation is merely market supporting such as is con-
tract and proper antitrust law, it may have some theoretical basis. But
Mr. Nader and Mr. Green in effect call any laws they like enabling
regulation. Anti-discrimination laws, occupational health and safety
requirements, and unemployment compensation may be good laws and
may arguably be grounded in economic efficiency.2- To lump them
24. See Williamson, Economics as an Antitrust Defense: The W elfare Tradeoffs, 58
A.saa. EcoN,. Rxv. 18 (1968).
95. Some may argue that anti-discrimination laws serve economic efficiency in that
they compel market participants to govern their behavior according to monetary returns
alone and to disregard certain psychic benefits. Nevertheless, economic efficiency can
readily be thought to include psychic benefit and it is the case that we do not regulate
that form of reward generally, i.e., why not a law against taking the color of a product
into account? For that reason, I prefer to justify such laws on non-market rationales,
which are legion.
Unemployment compensation may be thought of as a corollary to governmental control
of money, which necessarily affects employment opportunities. Health and safety require-
ments are more difficult to justify in such terms. I can understand why an emplo)er might
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together as Mr. Nader and Mr. Green do, however, is simply to aban-
don the search for theory. Advocates of the farm program and the Lock-
heed loan, after all, rely heavily on the need to protect individuals in
the productive process. Indeed, there are few instances of economic
regulation that cannot be justified on such grounds so long as they are
consistent with one's preferences.
Similarly, most of Mr. Nader and Mr. Green's proposals for increas-
ing the flow of information seem based on personal preference, rather
than market failure. For example, absent some showing of market fail-
ure, there is no reason to treat information differently than any other
commodity. Competition rewards those who provide the information
desired by consumers. One can expect entrepreneurs to establish inde-
pendent testing organizations where the value of information to con-
sumers is greater than the cost of collection and transmittal. One
scholar who has studied securities regulation has confirmed the propo-
sition that general expectations of increased benefits to the consumer
from regulation of information are mistaken.2
To be sure, I have heard it argued that in some cases a free rider
effect deters entrepreneurs from going into the information business
or that where there is a high risk or danger of addiction, e.g., cigarettes,
market forces are slower than government where the product has no
close substitutes. Even assuming that such contentions are true, one
must still bring the argument to the retail level and scrutinize particu-
lar markets, rather than call for general regulation.
Where questions of definition are concerned, it can also be argued
that a competitive market may lead to a proliferation of confusing defi-
nitions. But while defining weights and measures or the import of
contractual language may be a proper role for government, that is not
the same as imposing on consumers the cost of collecting and trans-
mitting information which they find has little value.
D. Yardstick Enterprise
The final circumstance in which Mr. Nader and Mr. Green call for
economic regulation involves what they term yardstick enterprise .2
be held strictly liable for such injuries (see Calabresi and Hirschoff, Toward a Test for
Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055 (1972)), but other kinds of regulation raise
more difficult questions for the reasons stated earlier in the discussion of safety regula-
tion. (The extent of Mr. Nader and Mr. Green's confusion is reflected in the fact that,
having engaged in a substantial discussion of the justifications for "safety regulation,"
they call occupational health and safety requirements "enabling regulation.")
26. G. STIGLER et al., CAN REGULATORY AGENCIES PROTECT TIlE CONSUAER 12 (American
Enterprise Institute, 1971).
27. Green & Nader, supra note 2, at 886-87.
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Again, all of their talk of "public need" and setting "an example for
private enterprise" comes down to the proposition that the government
ought to engage in certain activities which Mr. Nader and Mr. Green
personally find worthy. One will recall how heavily "yardstick" argu-
ments were relied on by proponents of the supersonic transport and the
space program. I do not know whether Mr. Nader and Mr. Green
support those particular endeavors, but, given the right personal pref-
erences, those projects certainly fall within their definition of yard-
stick enterprise.
Mr. Nader and Mr. Green have admirably established the case for
economic deregulation. In so doing, however, they step onto the slip-
pery slope. Just as one piece of regulation has led to another, so too the
genie of deregulation, once released, is not easily contained. The very
logic of their condemnation of existing regulation undercuts what
they offer us in their theory of economic regulation, a theory, which,
when scrutinized, unfortunately comes down to the maxim, "What-
ever Ralph Nader thinks is best for the country is best for the coun-
try." That is a proposition, I think, that commands the intellectual
respect it deserves.
IV
The one major change in regulatory process Mr. Nader and Mr.
Green suggest is the establishment of a Consumer Protection Agency
to represent consumers before other federal agencies.28 Since it is
thought that the other agencies have failed in part because only spe-
cial interests appear before them, it is hoped that this new agency will
improve overall regulatory performance. Unless there is truly magic
in a name, however, we must conclude that the reasons this agency
will be able to avoid the pitfalls which have downed its predecessors
are anything but self-evident. Sloth, inefficiency, and responsiveness
to special interests can prey on it as easily as they have preyed on its
brethren. Indeed, the very argument that widespread agency failure
can be cured by the creation of yet another agency seems to answer
itself.
Such an agency, moreover, seems wrong in concept. Legal represen-
tation can be effective only when there is a single interest to represent.
Where, as with consumers, there is no homogeneous, single interest,
representation is impossible. For this reason, the proposed Consumer
Protection Agency must always be the principal rather than the agent.
28. Id. at 888-89.
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Consumer tastes vary widely as to products, appearance, quality, safety,
durability, price, and so on. Every purchase involves innumerable
trade-offs among such matters; a single agency can represent only the
views of certain consumers. To be sure, more might be represented
than previously, but there is no reason to expect the agency to add
any more than another narrow interest group to the detriment of the
most powerless in our society.
It is interesting to speculate on whether the "consumer tastes" such
an agency is likely to represent are those of the upper-income consumer.
While consumerism appears as an anti-establishment movement, a
closer examination suggests it may be largely the ideological handi-
work of the liberal, upper-middle class. To be sure, law can compel the
production of "better" products, but only by increasing their cost. It
can also compel, at a cost, the dissemination of detailed product infor-
mation which is of greatest value to the highly educated. All these
measures must decrease output and in particular decrease the produc-
tion of cheap, mass produced goods. It is all very well for middle and
higher income groups to call for more quality and safety when they
can afford it. Laws compelling greater production of "better" goods
may, because of economies of scale, make such goods less expensive.
But such laws may also eliminate the even cheaper products the poor
can now afford. We have had much experience in the past with pro-
ducer groups seeking governmental protection from competition. Can
one now make the argument that consumerism is unique in seeking
a monopoly for the consuming tastes of its members, the upper-middle
class?
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